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COMMENTARY ON ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE
WASHINGTON TREATY†
Matjaž Kačič*
INTRODUCTION
The present essay presents a commentary on Articles 2 and 3 of the
Washington Treaty. Written on the Treaty’s seventieth anniversary, the
commentary seeks to contribute to the NATO legal community and to the wider
audience, such as academics, politicians, diplomatic personnel and civil society
interested in NATO legal issues. The commentary contains an outline of the
drafting history, implementation and textual legal analysis of both Article 2 and
3, and posits that NATO is much more than a purely military organization
focused only on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—collective defense against
armed attack. NATO’s aims and objectives, such as preservation of peace and
security in the North Atlantic area and worldwide, preservation of the rule of
law, democracy, and freedom are pursued through a wide variety of military and
non-military ways for which Articles 2 and 3 of the Washington Treaty provide
a firm basis.1
ARTICLE 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful
and friendly international relations by strengthening their free
institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles
upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting
conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate
conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage
economic collaboration between any or all of them.2

A. Drafting History and Textual Analysis
For the Washington Treaty founders, the notion of peace went far beyond
the mere absence of war. They believed that the Washington Treaty had to
†
This commentary is written in author’s personal capacity and may not reflect agreed upon policy or
views of the NATO International Staff or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
*
NATO IS Executive Management Division.
1
The author is grateful to Mr. Steven Hill, NATO IS Legal Adviser and Director of NATO IS Office of
Legal Affairs, as well as to Ms. Lone Kjelgaard and Mrs. Nadia Marsan, NATO Senior Assistant Legal Advisers,
for their precious advice, comments, and suggestions on various legal issues examined in this commentary.
2
North Atlantic Treaty art. 2, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
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represent more than a mere collective defense arrangement.3 According to the
then United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, the Washington Treaty
was supposed to provide a framework for strengthening “the morale and positive
elements on which true peace depends.”4 He most likely drew inspiration from
the preambles of the Brussels and Rio Treaties,5 which contained a general
reference to morale and positive bases of peace.6 For example, the State Parties
to the Rio Treaty considered:
That the obligation of mutual assistance and common defense of the
American Republics is essentially related to their democratic ideals
and to their will to cooperate permanently in the fulfillment of the
principles and purposes of a policy of peace . . . Peace is founded on
justice and moral order.7

The absence of free institutions in certain parts of the world led the Allies to
commit to strengthening their free institutions and to pay continuous attention
to that aspect, whereas the reference to “better understanding of the principles
upon which these institutions are founded’’ denotes the important role of public
opinion within and outside the Alliance.8
In order to maintain “peaceful and friendly relations,” Allies also committed
to engage in economic collaboration. It is interesting to note that an earlier draft
of Article 2 spoke not only about economic collaboration, but also about cultural
and social collaboration, mirroring the Brussels Treaty.9 Specifically, the earlier
draft referred to “efforts between any or all of the Parties to promote the general
welfare through collaboration in the economic, social and cultural fields.”10 This
was further accompanied by an additional provision stating that the different
types of collaboration would not interfere with or duplicate the work and
activities of other international organizations of which NATO Allies might be
3
NATO, North Atlantic Pact: The Drafting of the Treaty, PACT D-6/1, 8 (Mar. 29, 1949) (copy on file
with the author) [hereinafter The Drafting of the Treaty].
4
Id.
5
Id. Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio
Treaty]; Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Mar. 17, 1948, 19
U.N.T.S. 304 [hereinafter Brussels Treaty]. The Brussels and Rio Treaties preceded the Washington Treaty, they
established the Western Union and the Organisation of American States, respectively, and they both provided
for a collective defense arrangement. Id.
6
See generally Rio Treaty, supra note 5.
7
Id. pmbl.
8
Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Exec. L, North Atlantic Treaty, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949) at 10.
9
Brussels Treaty, supra note 5.
10
The Drafting of the Treaty, supra note 3 at 8.
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members. Instead, collaboration within NATO framework would be
complementary to the activities and work of international organizations.11 On
the insistence of the United States, the earlier version was abandoned. The
United States felt that the provision, if adopted, would have given the impression
that the Alliance was supposed to undertake concrete measures in the fields of
cultural, social and economic collaboration.12 Allies achieved a compromise by
retaining only economic collaboration.13
All in all, by cherishing the values of a free, prosperous, and progressive
society, the Washington Treaty was also conceived as a strong antipode to
communism. To this point, the then foreign minister of Canada and later its
Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent, argued that besides being a military force, the
Alliance must be also an economic and morale force “as the struggle was for the
control of men’s minds and men’s souls.”14
B. Implementation of Article 2
Some years after the adoption of the Washington Treaty, Allies felt the need
to give more substance to Article 2, as well as to affirm the non-military mandate
of the Alliance. To such an end, on May 5, 1956, the North Atlantic Council
established the Committee of the Three.15 The Committee was composed of the
so-called “Three Wise Men,” the ministers of foreign affairs of Norway, Italy,
and Canada.16 The mandate of the Committee was to produce a report containing
concrete measures and proposals to trigger and enhance non-military
collaboration among Allies, such as political, economic, scientific, and cultural
collaboration.17 The report was presented and endorsed at the North Atlantic
Council on December 13, 1956.18

11
In many ways the focus on complementarity and the avoidance of duplication with other international
organizations has been a constant theme in NATO’s history, see, e.g. Press Release, European Council, Joint
Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation (July 10, 2018).
12
The Drafting of the Treaty, supra note 3, at 9.
13
Jamie Shea, What can we Learn Today from the ‘Three Wise Men’?, NATO REV. MAG. (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/three-wise-men-nato-military-alliance/EN/index.htm.
Economic collaboration was introduced into Article 2 by Canada. Id.
14
The Drafting of the Treaty, supra note 3, at 9.
15
The Three Wise Men Report and the Origins of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme,
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_139363.
htm.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
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With regard to political collaboration, the report urged Allies to consult
among themselves on any political issues significantly affecting the Alliance or
any issues of interest to the Alliance. The report called on Allies to take into
account the views of other Allies when adopting national policies. In addition,
the report also advocated for submission of disputes involving Allies to NATO’s
consideration before resorting to other international dispute settlement
mechanisms.19 Finally, the report paved the way for the establishment of a
NATO Committee of Political Advisers—soon renamed to Political
Committee.20
The report also addressed economic collaboration. It commended Allies to
maintain healthy economies and to promote international trade.21 It further
called on Allies to consult on important economic issues, especially on those
economic issues giving rise to defense and security implications or economic
issues having an impact on the Alliance as a whole.22 Finally, the report
recommended the creation of a NATO Committee of Economic Advisers, which
was eventually created in 1957.23
In the scientific field the report discussed the important role of technology
and science for the Alliance and for peace and security in general. Following the
advice given by the “Three Wise Men,” Allies established the NATO Science
Programme, which provided a platform for the scientific research collaboration
and exchange of scientific resources. In 1958, the NATO Science Programme
turned into NATO Science for Peace and Security, which provided further
possibilities for scientific collaboration among Allies as well as with partner
nations.24
Finally, the report touched upon social collaboration and collaboration in the
field of information. The “Three Wise Men” proposed, inter alia, the use of
NATO information material(s) in schools, closer relations between NATO and

19
NATO Doc. C-M(56)127, ¶¶ 51, 57 (Dec. 1956), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_
17481.htm.
20
Report of the Committee of Three, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/topics_65237.htm.
21
N. Atlantic Treaty Org. [NATO], Rep. of the Comm. on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, ¶ 61,
NATO Doc. C-M(56)127 (Dec. 13, 1956), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17481.htm.
22
Id. ¶ 64.
23
Report of the Committee of Three, supra note 20.
24
NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme: Sixty Years Old, Still Going Strong, NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_160936.htm.
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youth organizations25 and the translation of NATO material(s) into as many
languages as possible.26
The report of the “Three Wise Men” was a revolutionary document as it
decisively reaffirmed the non-military nature of the otherwise military Alliance
by establishing the basis for political, scientific, economic and technological
collaboration within the Alliance.
ARTICLE 3
“In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the
Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help
and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack.”27
A. Drafting History
The first draft of Article 3 took inspiration from the United States Senate
resolution 239, commonly known as the Vandenberg Resolution, which served
as the principal guide for the United States delegation at the Washington Treaty
negotiations. The first draft called for an “individual and collective effort, on the
basis of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid to strengthen the
individual and collective capacity of the Parties to resist aggression.”28
Generally, the language of the first draft differed from the current language of
Article 3 in two important aspects. Namely, the first draft provided for
“individual and collective effort” instead of “separately and jointly” and referred
to “capacity to resist aggression” instead of “capacity to resist armed attack.”29
The next, second, draft retained the reference to “aggression” but changed
“individual and common effort” into “jointly and separately.”30 Furthermore, it
also introduced an opening sentence. The second draft read: “In order to better
assure the security of the North Atlantic area, the parties will use every endeavor,
separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and

25
26
27
28
29
30

NATO Doc. C-M(56)127, supra note 19, ¶¶ 75-77.
Id. ¶ 86.
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3.
The Drafting of the Treaty, supra note 3, at 10.
Id.
Id.
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mutual aid, to strengthen their individual and collective capacity to resist
aggression.”31
The reference to “the security of the North Atlantic area” turned out to be
deemed inappropriate to the founding Allies, as they believed that “self-help and
mutual aid” apply to the Treaty as a whole, and not only to “the security of the
North Atlantic area.”32 Consequently, in the third draft the opening sentence
attained its current form: “In order to more effectively to achieve the objectives
of this Treaty.…”33
The fourth draft further removed the words “use every” before the word
“endeavour,” making it: “the Parties will endeavor . . . .”34 That was done out of
fear that Article 3 might otherwise encourage an arms race or continual boost of
military capacity and preparedness by the Allies. Finally, the term “endeavour”
was considered too weak, which led to the adoption of the fifth draft establishing
the current form: “Parties will . . . maintain and develop . . . .”35
Finally, the sixth draft aligned the language of Article 3 with the language
of the U.N. Charter, concretely with its Article 51.36 As the U.N. Charter spoke
of the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence against armed
attack,” and since the Washington Treaty holds a reference to the U.N. Charter’s
right of collective self-defence, the founding Allies decided to follow the
language in the U.N. Charter.37 Hence, they replaced the term “aggression” with
the term “armed attack.”38
B. Textual Analysis
Article 3 calls on Allies to build resilience39 against armed attack through
“continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.”40 In essence, the phrase
indicates that resilience of the Alliance against armed attack can be best achieved
through individual and common effort. Accordingly, each Ally needs to do its
Id.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 10–11.
36
See U.N. Charter art. 51.
37
Id.; The Drafting of the Treaty, supra note 3, at 10–11.
38
Id. at 11.
39
In plain language, resilience might be defined as capacity to recover and to bounce back after a crisis
or disruption, see Definition of Reslience, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2019), https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/resilience.
40
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3.
31
32
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best for its own resilience—national resilence—and contribute in any other way
to the resilience of other Allies. By developing and maintaining “capacity to
resist armed attack,” an Ally does not only diminish the likelihood of being a
victim of armed attack—the concept of deterrence—but it also increases its
ability to adequately respond to an actual armed attack. Moreover, it makes itself
capable of receiving assistance from other Allies and providing assistance to
other Allies. With regard to the latter, the nature and type of “mutual aid” or
assistance that Allies would need to provide to one another has been at the heart
of the debates during and after the negotiations of the Washington Treaty. In
order to clarify this and other issues concerning the interpretation of the
Washington Treaty, the founding Allies—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United
States—adopted informal and non-binding interpretative minutes to the
Washington Treaty, which contained, inter alia, a definition of the term “Mutual
Aid.”41 “Mutual Aid” was defined as “the contribution by each Party, consistent
with its geographic location and resources and with due regard to the
requirements of economic recovery, of such mutual aid as it can reasonably be
expected to contribute in the form in which it can most effectively furnish it, e.g.
facilities, manpower, productive capacity, or military equipment.”42
Soon after the Washington Treaty came into force, the U.S. provided
assistance to European Allies under the so-called military assistance program.43
Approximately 1.4 billion dollars were given to European Allies with the aim of
boosting their military capacities.44 If one were to look at recent cases of
assistance, one can point at the deployment of four NATO-led multinational
battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance in 2017 in order to deter Russia
from engaging in aggressive behavior vis-à-vis Eastern Allies.45
The phrase “capacity to resist armed attack” also calls for interpretation.46 In
the first place, one can note that the phrase does not specify the exact type of
individual capacity required to resist armed attack. For example, it does not refer
strictly to military capacity. The general reference to capacity as well as the
41
Interpretative Minute of the 18th Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security on 15
March 1949.
42
Id.
43
See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.
gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato.
44
Id.
45
Boosting NATO’s Presence in the East and Southeast, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en.
46
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3.
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article’s initial general reference “to achieve the objectives of [the] Treaty”47
leads to the conclusion that the capacity to resist armed attack goes beyond
military capacity. It also includes, inter alia, civil readiness, economic
strength,48 ability to make financial contributions to NATO missions, morale,
etc.49
One can also note that Article 3 does not set out the exact level of national
capacity required “to resist armed attack.” The founding Allies envisaged that
the level of national capacity required would be the subject of regular assessment
taking into account the likelihood of a potential aggression, the strength of a
potential aggressor, the prevailing general security situation, and the capacity of
the U.N. to safeguard peace and security in the North Atlantic area and outside
of it.
Finally, the term “resist” is a matter of interpretation.50 Does the term imply
that an Ally needs to be in a position to defend itself and to repel an armed attack
on its own, or does it mean that an Ally needs to be strong enough to be able to
hold off an enemy until the rest of the Alliance can come to its assistance? There
can be no straightforward answer to that question since much will depend on the
circumstances of a concrete case.
C. Implementation of Article 3
1. National Resilience
a. Military Capacity, Fair Burden-Sharing and Interoperability
Military capacity is definitely one of the strong components of national
resilience. Each Ally is encouraged to maintain and develop a strong-armed
force and military equipment, capable of being deployed and capable of resisting
any form of armed attack. Nevertheless, failing to do so does not necessarily put
the Ally in violation of Article 3 of the Washington Treaty if the Ally contributes
to its resilience and resilience of the Alliance in other forms as it has been
described before. In this regard, Iceland is a perfect example. Although the Ally

47
Id. The Preamble of the Washington Treaty speaks of peace, freedom, human rights, democracy,
common heritage, individual liberty and the rule of law. Id. pmbl.
48
Resilience and Article 3, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (June 25, 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/topics_132722.htm.
49
Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Exec. L, supra note 8, at 9–10.
50
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3.
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does not have a proper armed force, it is nonetheless highly valued within the
Alliance especially because of its strategic geographical location, solid
infrastructure,51 and for its financial and civilian contributions to NATO-led
missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan.52
Apart from Iceland, it is true that all Allies indeed maintain armed forces and
military equipment, whose strength and status are regularly discussed in the
context of a broader “fair burden-sharing” debate.53 Fair burden-sharing has
been at the heart of the Alliance since the beginning and came to prominence
even more in the post-Cold War period, which marked a significant decline of
the majority of European defense budgets.54 In that regard, European Allies have
been criticized for neglecting and not investing in their military capabilities, and
for being consequently overly reliant on the United States.55 Being faced with
emerging modern security threats, such as hybrid and cyber threats, and Russian
illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2014, all Allies
openly and officially declared their commitment to reverse declining defense
budgets most prominently at the Wales Summit in 2014.56 The pledge called on
each Ally to aim at spending at least 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
on defense and spending at least 20% of its defense budget ‘‘on major new
equipment, including related Research & Development . . . .’’57
By 2018, only eight Allies met the 2% target,58 whereas by 2024 fewer than
half of the Allies are planning to meet it.59 When it comes to meeting the 20%
target, the picture is much better as twenty-four Allies plan to meet the target by

51
The Keflavik Air Base is used by Allied navies for military exercises and air policing (surveillance)
among other things. See Megan Eckstein, Iceland Embracing Its Strategic Location by Supporting NATO Air
Defense, USNI NEWS (Oct. 24, 2018), https://news.usni.org/2018/10/24/iceland-embracing-its-strategiclocation-though-supporting-nato-air-defense-hosting-us-planes.
52
NATO Deputy Secretary General Thanks Iceland for its Contribution to European Security, NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Mar. 8, 2017) https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_142025.htm?
selectedLocale=en.
53
See Alexander Mattelaer, US Leadership and NATO: Revisiting the Principles of NATO BurdenSharing, 46 PARAMETERS 25, 25 (2016).
54
See id. at 28, 33.
55
Id.
56
See id. at 32.
57
Press Release, NATO, Wales Summit Declaration (Sept. 5, 2014).
58
Ryan Heath, 8 NATO Countries to hit Defense Spending, POLITICO (May 7, 2018), https://www.
politico.eu/article/nato-jens-stoltenberg-donald-trump-8-countries-to-hit-defense-spending-target/.
59
Steven Grundman, NATO’s 2 Percent Guideline: What About the United States?, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
(July, 10 2018), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-s-2-percent-guideline-what-aboutthe-united-states.
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2024.60 From a legal perspective, the question that is posed is whether a breach
of the 2% and 20% targets by 2024 will have any implications for the noncompliant Allies. In other words, are NATO Summit Declarations and the 2%
and 20% targets legally binding on Allies? The answer to that question is not
straightforward. In general terms, NATO Summit Declarations are legally
binding on Allies as they can be treated/considered as decisions adopted by the
North Atlantic Council.61 Yet, the language used in NATO Summit Declarations
might sometimes indicate otherwise. This seems to be the case in relation to 2%
and 20% targets contained in the Wales Summit Declaration. Namely, the Wales
Summit Declaration says that Allies will ‘‘aim’’ to hit the 2% and 20% targets
by 2024.62 Therefore, it seems possible to argue that the concrete defense
spending pledge is of political, rather than legal nature.63
Taking into account that NATO embodies military cooperation among
Allies, Allies should not make sure only to have well-equipped and operational
armed forces but also, they have to ensure that they are interoperable among
them. In this respect, interoperability is another very important capability
envisioned under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. NATO’s interoperability
policy defines the notion as ‘‘the ability of Allies to act together coherently,
effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic
objectives.’’64 In other words, operability seeks to enable effective cooperation
among Allies, to achieve, for example, maximum use of existing resources, to
avoid their duplication, and most importantly to overcome differences among
Allies in military equipment, communication systems, military procedures and
tactics and legal regulations.65 It does not necessarily seek to impose on Allies
unified military equipment and procedures; rather interoperability strives to find
a way for different equipment, systems and procedures to operate and work
together. Interoperability is pursued mainly through standardization, exercises,
training, tests, trials, missions, partnerships and cooperation with industry.66
60

Press Release, NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration, (July 11, 2018).
Federico Fabbrini, Do NATO Obligations Trump European Budgetary Constraints?, 9 HARV. NAT’L
SECURITY J.L 121, 133 (2018).
62
Wales Summit Declaration, supra note 57.
63
Jan Techau, The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe, CARNEGIE EUROPE
(Sep. 2, 2015), https://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/09/02/politics-of-2-percent-nato-and-security-vacuum-ineurope-pub-61139. But see Federico Fabbrini, Do NATO Obligations Trump European Budgetary Constraints?,
9 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 121,133 (2018).
64
Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (June 6, 2017),
https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_84112.htm.
65
Id.
66
Id.
61
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The standardization process plays a key role in the field of interoperability.
NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) seek to provide uniform
procedures and equipment between NATO member states. STANAGs address a
variety of subjects, such as the use of language in joint Allied operations,67
procedures for environment protection during military operations, refueling
procedures and specifications for common ground station for unmanned aerial
vehicles used by NATO forces. STANAGS are adopted and published by the
NATO Standardization Office.68 While STANAGs might be deemed crucial for
achieving interoperability, they do not have binding force on Allies. Rather they
are considered as guidelines or recommendations to Allies.
Trainings and exercises are also vital for strengthening interoperability of
Allies as they test the Allied level of interoperability in practice. Exercises
enable Allies to develop best practices and to identify fields for improvement.
With regard to missions, Allies have strengthened and tested their
interoperability in missions in the Balkans, Libya, the Mediterranean, and
Afghanistan.69
NATO also seeks to achieve interoperability with partner nations. Different
partnership programmes, such as Partnership for Peace Programme,
Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, inter alia, aim at
enabling partner nations to act jointly with NATO-led forces.70
Interoperability is needed also in the legal field since it often happens that
Allies have different or divergent legal regulations—for example, on the use of
force in self-defense. In such cases, dialogue among national and NATO legal
advisers helps to clarify the different legal views of different Allies and may lead
to a more uniform or common legal understanding or legal regime.71
b. Civil Readiness and the Role of the Private Sector
In case of armed attack, the ability of the attacked state to effectively resist
67
The very first STANAGs recognized the importance of a common language for interoperability
purposes. In this respect, they laid down the common standards for English and French language proficiency.
See NATO Standardization Office, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (June 9, 2017), https://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/topics_124879.htm.
68
Backgrounder-Interoperability for Joint Operations, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (July
2006), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120116_interoperability-en.pdf.
69
Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces, supra note 64.
70
Backgrounder-Interoperability for Joint Operations, supra note 68.
71
See generally Marten Zwanenburg, International Humanitarian Law Interoperability in Multinational
Operations, 95 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 681 (2013).
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armed attack will be heavily dependent on the status of its civil infrastructure
and the availability of civil resources. For example, good infrastructure enables
a high level of mobility of the military personnel and military equipment.
Likewise, military forces when deployed rely on civil resources, such as energy,
food, water, medical resources.
In the past, the infrastructure—railways, ports, airfields, grids, airspace,
etc.—was mainly state-owned and consequently easily available to the state or
NATO armed forces in a crisis. The state administration was solely and
exclusively responsible for maintaining a well-functioning infrastructure
together with sufficient civil resources. With the end of the Cold War, however,
the ownership of the state infrastructure began to shift steadily in the hands of
the private sector. Hence, the private sector began to play a crucial role in crisis
management. Nowadays, the interdependence of the military and private sector
is fully recognized and acknowledged. It is estimated that around 90% of the
NATO supplies and equipment is transported by private companies and
approximately 75% of the support given by eastern Allies to NATO forces
deployed on their territories is provided through contracts with private
companies.72 Judging from the figures, it is clear that there can be no civil
preparedness without the involvement of the private sector. It is therefore
imperative for NATO and Allies to establish a good cooperation with the private
sector.
Throughout the years, Allies have devoted a lot of attention to civil
preparedness. In the “Commitment To Enhance Resilience” adopted during the
Warsaw Summit 2016, Allies pledged to strengthen their civil preparedness and
affirmed that civil preparedness is a national responsibility.73 Allies further
agreed to fulfil seven baseline requirements for national resilience, including:
1) Assured continuity of government and critical government
services;74
2) Resilient energy,75 water, food, and medical supplies;
3) Resilient transport system;
72
Jamie Shea, Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence, NATO REV. MAG. (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/also-in-2016/nato-defence-cyber-resilience/en/index.htm.
73
Press Release, NATO, Commitment to Enhance Resilience (July 8, 2016).
74
See Resilience and Article 3, supra note 48. Ability to make decisions, communicate and enforce them
in a crisis. Id.
75
Stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of import routes, suppliers and energy resources,
and the interconnectivity of energy networks are of crucial importance, see Press Release, NATO, Warsaw
Summit Communiqué, (July 9, 2016).
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4) Resilient civil communications systems and cyber networks.76
Among all the enumerated fields, cyber defense capacity deserves special
attention. Military assets—airplanes, tanks, ships, etc.—have become
increasingly reliant on digital technology. A large number of systems used on or
by ships, aircrafts, submarines and unmanned vehicles, such as mechanical and
electrical systems, weapons and navigations systems, aviation systems, and
control systems are in one way or another connected to the internet. While on
one hand internet and other technologies contribute to the better functioning of
military assets and infrastructure, they at the same time put the same assets and
infrastructure at greater risk of cyber-related intrusions, such as unauthorized
access and stealing of data, introduction of malware and direct malicious attacks
to systems and networks.77 These systems can be attacked by anyone from
anywhere, and at any moment by cyber means. The unpredictable nature of
cyber-attacks makes cyber-attacks very difficult to anticipate and repel.
In light of the increasing number of threatening cyber-attacks both on
national and NATO networks, Allies adopted a NATO Enhanced Cyber Defence
Policy at the Wales Summit in 2014.78 The policy recognized that cyber-attacks
may threaten ‘‘national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability’’
and may reach the threshold of an armed attack.79 It also affirmed that
international law as a whole applies to cyber space and that cyber defense falls
under NATO’s mandate of collective self-defense.80 Finally, and most
importantly in the context of resilience, it underlined that while NATO’s core
task in the area of cyber defense is to protect its own networks81 and to provide
cyber defense assistance to Allies upon request,82 Allies are primarily
responsible to guard and protect their national networks—national cyber
76
Resilience and Article 3, supra note 48. Allies envisaged that NATO’s role would be to assist and
facilitate the process of enhancing civil preparedness of Allies. Id.
77
Ralph D. Thiele, Game Changer: Cyber Security in the Naval Domain, 530 INST. STRATEGIC POL.
ECON. CONSULTANCY 1, 3–4 (2018).
78
Wales Summit Declaration, supra note 57 ¶¶ 72–73.
79
Id. ¶ 72.
80
See id.
81
The NATO Communications and Information Agency is entrusted with the protection of NATO’s
networks. See NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency), NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69332.htm.
82
NATO might assist an Ally victim of a cyber-attack by deploying the so-called “Rapid Reaction
Teams” which consist of cyber defense experts specifically trained to mitigate harmful and adverse
consequences of cyber-attacks. See NATO Rapid Reaction Team to Fight Cyber Attack, NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION (Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_85161.htm. The Rapid
Reaction Teams tool might be seen as an example of “mutual aid.’ Id.
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resilience.83 The Enhanced Policy was further updated at the Warsaw Summit
2016, where Allies recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations, reaffirmed
the principles laid down in the Enhanced Cyber Policy, and adopted the so-called
‘‘Cyber Defense Pledge.’’84 Through the Cyber Defence Pledge, Allies
committed to strengthen cyber defense of national networks and infrastructure
in line with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty.85 Among other things, they
agreed to allot sufficient financial resources to develop national cyber defense
capabilities, to foster cyber defense education, training and exercises, to improve
understanding of cyber threats and to improve interaction among relevant
national cyber defense stakeholders.86
Finally, at the Brussels Summit in 2018, Allies committed to establish a new
Cyberspace Operations Centre as part of NATO’s strengthened Command
Structure and called for integration of cyber sovereign national capabilities into
NATO-led operations and missions. Finally, Allies committed not only to deter
and defend against cyber-attacks, but also to counter them.87
II. ARTICLE 3 AND NATO’S COOPERATION WITH INDUSTRY, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS, AND PARTNER NATIONS
Article 3 provides also the basis for NATO’s cooperation with industry,
international organizations, and partner nations. Over the years, NATO has
strived to establish close and genuine cooperation with these entities. The
following provides a summary of this cooperation as it reflects the response by
NATO to strategic and geo-political changes that have occurred over time.
A. Cooperation with Industry
NATO’s cooperation with industry revolves primarily around the IT sphere,
and in this regard, it crucially underpins NATO’s cyber resilience efforts. NATO
engages with industry through procurement and non-procurement cooperation.88
Through procurement, NATO acquires new cyber capabilities and services from
industry, whereas through non-procurement cooperation NATO might engage

83
84
85
86
87
88

Wales Summit Declaration, supra note 57.
Press Release, NATO, Cyber Defence Pledge (July 8, 2016).
Id.
Id.
Brussels Summit Declaration, supra note 60.
NATO, FRAMEWORK FOR NATO INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT ¶ 8.1 (2013).
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in discussions and exchanges of information with industry on capability
requirements and needs, including matters related to interoperability standards.89
Being aware that the majority of information systems are operated and
maintained by the private sector, and knowing that it possesses the necessary
knowledge and expertise on cyber defense, Allies at the Wales Summit in 2014
decided to give birth to the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP).90 NICP
provides a framework for engagement of NATO and industry/private sector in
the field of cyber defense of NATO-owned networks. It enables sharing of
information and expertise on cyber defense, developing best practices,
improving understanding of cyber risks, and improving NATO’s cyber defense
education, training, exercises.91
B. Cooperation with International Organisations
With regard to NATO’s cooperation with other international organizations,
NATO places a great emphasis on cooperation with the EU, U.N., and
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). NATO and its
Allies indeed share common objectives and values with the mentioned
organizations, such as preservation of international peace and security and
respect for human rights, freedom, democracy, and stability.92 Therefore, it is
not only legitimate, but also logical and imperative for NATO to engage in this
sort of cooperation.
NATO’s cooperation with the EU is especially important taking into account
that the majority of NATO member states are also EU member states. While
NATO-EU cooperation officially started in 2001, the cooperation gained real
momentum in 2016 and 2018 by the adoption of the Joint Declaration93 and the
second Joint Declaration, respectively.94 In the two declarations, NATO and EU
pledged to strengthen cooperation in the following areas: countering hybrid
threats, operational cooperation at sea and on migration, cyber security and

Id. ¶ 8.1
See Wales Summit Declaration, supra note 57.
91
NATO Cyber Defence-Factsheet, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Feb. 2018), https://www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_02/20180213_1802-factsheet-cyber-defence-en.pdf.
92
It is indeed important to emphasize that the Washington Treaty aims for preservation of peace and
security worldwide, not only within the North Atlantic area. See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 2.
93
Press Release, European Commission, Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the
President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(July 8, 2016).
94
Press Release, European Counsel, Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation (July 10, 2018).
89
90
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defense, defense capabilities, defense industry and research, exercises and
supporting Eastern and Southern partners’ capacity-building efforts.95 NATOEU cooperation is carried out in accordance with the principles of transparency,
openness, inclusiveness and reciprocity, and in full respect of the decisionmaking autonomy and procedures of both organizations without prejudice to the
specific character of the security and defense policy of any member state.96
In recent years EU has shown intention to develop an integrated defense
policy and a potential EU army. NATO has welcomed the initiative by
expressing the expectation that this will further enhance the resilience of
European Allies and will contribute to fairer burden-sharing within the Alliance.
At the same time, NATO has been urging EU to act complementarily to NATO
activities and to avoid duplication of efforts. 97
Long before NATO set up cooperation with the EU, NATO already had in
place an effective cooperation with the U.N. Since the early 1990s, NATO and
the U.N. have been consistently enhancing and developing cooperation.
Especially, the field of operations has been at the heart of NATO-U.N.
cooperation. NATO-led operations in the Western Balkans, Afghanistan and
Libya implemented binding U.N. Security Council resolutions.98 Also the
NATO training mission in Iraq in 2014 was set up partly pursuant to a U.N.
Security Council resolution.99 In addition to peace-support and peacekeeping
operations, NATO-U.N. cooperation covers a wide variety of fields, such as
crisis assessment and management, civil-military cooperation, training and
education, corruption in the defense sector, mine action, mitigation of the threat
posed by improvised explosive devices, civilian capabilities, promotion of the
role of women in peace and security, protection of civilians, including children
in armed conflict, sexual and gender-based violence, arms control and nonproliferation and the fight against terrorism.100

95
See Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European
Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, supra note 93; Joint
Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, supra note 94.
96
Id.
97
Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General, NATO, Doorstep Statement prior to the European Union Foreign
Affairs Council Meeting (Nov. 20, 2018) (on file with NATO).
98
Relations with the United Nations, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50321.htm.
99
S.C. Res. 1546 (June 8, 2004).
100
Relations with the United Nations, supra note 98; see also Updated Joint Declaration on UN-NATO,
NATO (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_160004.htm.
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Last but not least, NATO cherishes cooperation with the OSCE. This
cooperation includes but is not limited to combating transnational threats,
including terrorism and cyber threats, border management and security,
disarmament, small arms and light weapons, confidence and security-building
measures, regional issues and exchange of experience on the respective
Mediterranean dimensions.101 Cooperation between OSCE and NATO took
place also on the ground. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo and NATO-led Kosovo
Force (KFOR) established close ties in Kosovo.102 Finally, the OSCE’s Election
Support Teams during the Afghan Presidential and Parliamentary Elections
benefited from the security assistance by NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force.103
C. Cooperation with Partner Nations
The reference to the objectives of the Treaty in Article 3 also provides the
basis for NATO’s cooperation with partner nations.104 Through cooperation with
partner nations NATO contributes to security and stability outside the Alliance,
which in turn has positive effects on the security and stability of the Alliance
and on Allies themselves—projecting stability doctrine.
In order to contribute to peace and stability outside the Alliance, throughout
the years NATO has established different partnerships with third nations and
developed different partnership programmes, such as: Partnership for Peace
Programme, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.105 Partnerships benefit both NATO and
partner nations. They enable close consultations between NATO and partner
nations on regional security matters, and they shape common crisis-prevention
approaches. Partner countries engage in and contribute to NATO-led operations.
Also, partner nations gain access to NATO education courses, trainings, and
exercises. NATO can also assist partner countries in the process of developing

See What we Do, OSCE, https://www.osce.org/what-we-do.
NATO, OSCE, https://www.osce.org/partnerships/111485.
103
Id.
104
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3.
105
See Partnership for Peace Programme, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jun. 7, 2017), https://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50349.htm; NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_60021.htm?selectedLocale=en;
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Nov. 18, 2011), https://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/topics_58787.htm?selectedLocale=en; Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORG. (Jun. 9, 2017), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49276.htm.
101
102

KACICPROOFS2_10.24.19

70

10/28/2019 1:59 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

their capability, as well as their defense and security institutions.106 In addition,
partnerships might better prepare interested partner nations to join the Alliance.
Cooperation is carried out in accordance with the principles of mutual benefit,
reciprocity and respect. At the Brussels Summit 2018, Allies recognized that
“Partners have made and continue to make substantial contributions to Alliance
operations, missions, and practical cooperation activities. [Allies reaffirmed
their] commitment to expand political dialogue and practical cooperation with
any nation that shares the Alliance’s values and interest in international peace
and security….’’107
CONCLUSION
Articles 2 and 3 of the Washington Treaty clearly demonstrate that NATO
is much more than the famous article 5 that provides for collective self-defense
against armed attack. While Article 5 of the Washington Treaty has been
invoked only once in the entire history of the Alliance, Article 2 and 3 of the
Washington Treaty on the other hand provide the basis for regular, and even
daily activities of NATO and its Allies, including political and scientific
collaboration, missions, exercises and strengthening of cyber defense
capabilities.
Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, while initially designed to be more of a
political and declaratory nature, gained more substance with the report of the
‘‘Three Wise Men,’’ which laid down the basis for non-military cooperation
among Allies in the political, economic, scientific and technological fields.
As for Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, it can be considered one of the
most important articles of the Washington Treaty, if not the most important one.
It is complementarily to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty by urging each Ally
to develop its national resilience and contribute to the resilience of the Alliance
as a whole against an armed attack. One of the crucial points that the
commentary makes clear is that developing resilience goes beyond military
capacity, to include also civil readiness, cyber defense, economic strength and
morale.

106
107

Brussels Summit Declaration, supra note 60.
Id.

